More images from the massacre can be found at the end of the article. Viewer discretion is advised — they contain graphic content. Scroll down to see them.
The My Lai massacre, committed on March 16, 1968, remains one of the most infamous war crimes in U.S. history. It occurred in Sơn Mỹ village, Quảng Ngãi province, South Vietnam, during the Vietnam War.
Between 347 and 504 unarmed civilians were killed by U.S. Army soldiers, primarily from C Company of the 23rd (Americal) Division. The victims were mostly women, children, and elderly men, with some subjected to gang-rape and mutilation.
The operation began with C Company, commanded by Captain Ernest Medina, entering My Lai 4 expecting to engage the Viet Cong’s 48th Battalion. When no enemy forces were found, the troops turned their weapons on the villagers.
Civilians were rounded up, held in groups, and executed using automatic weapons, bayonets, and grenades. In one instance, soldiers shot an entire group of villagers in an irrigation ditch.
The violence extended beyond human lives. Homes were burned, livestock were slaughtered, and the village was left in ruins, creating a scene of utter devastation.
Amidst the chaos, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson Jr. and his helicopter crew tried to intervene. They rescued some civilians and confronted soldiers on the ground, but their efforts couldn’t stop the widespread killings.
On the same day, in the nearby hamlet of My Khe 4, B Company carried out a separate massacre. An additional 60 to 155 civilians were murdered, adding to the day’s carnage.
Initially, the massacre was reported as a battle against Viet Cong forces, with official reports framing it as a military success. The U.S. Army conducted internal investigations, but the findings were suppressed, keeping the truth hidden from the public.
It wasn’t until November 1969 that the massacre came to light, thanks to the efforts of Vietnam veteran Ronald Ridenhour and journalist Seymour Hersh. Their work revealed the full extent of the atrocity, sparking outrage both in the United States and around the world.
Twenty-six soldiers were eventually charged with criminal offenses, but accountability was limited. Only Lieutenant William Calley Jr., leader of C Company’s 1st Platoon, was convicted.
Calley was found guilty of murdering 22 villagers and sentenced to life in prison. However, his sentence was commuted by President Richard Nixon, and he ultimately served just three-and-a-half years under house arrest.
Prelude to the Massacre
Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division, arrived in South Vietnam in December 1967. In their first three months, they encountered no direct combat but suffered 28 casualties due to mines and booby traps.
The Tet Offensive in January 1968 intensified U.S. military efforts in the region. Military intelligence suspected that the Viet Cong 48th Local Force Battalion, which had retreated after the offensive, was hiding in Sơn Mỹ village, Quảng Ngãi province.
Sơn Mỹ was considered a stronghold for the Viet Cong, with specific hamlets, designated Mỹ Lai (1) through Mỹ Lai (6), believed to be harboring enemy fighters. The village lay southwest of the Batangan Peninsula, an area known for persistent Viet Cong activity.
By February and March 1968, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was focused on regaining control after the Tet Offensive. The search-and-destroy operation targeting the 48th Battalion in Sơn Mỹ became part of this larger military strategy.
Task Force Barker (TF Barker), a battalion-sized unit of the 11th Brigade, was assigned to the operation. Formed in January 1968, it included three rifle companies, one of which was Charlie Company, led by Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker.
Sơn Mỹ village fell within TF Barker’s area of operations, designated as Muscatine AO. The name came from Muscatine County, Iowa, home to the 23rd Infantry Division’s commander, Major General Samuel W. Koster.
A previous attempt to secure Sơn Mỹ in February 1968 had achieved little. Troops began referring to the area as “Pinkville,” a slang term derived from the pinkish-red markings used on military maps to indicate population density.
Before the planned operation on March 16–18, 1968, Colonel Oran K. Henderson, commander of the 11th Brigade, instructed his officers to attack aggressively. His orders were to close in on the enemy and “wipe them out for good.”
Lieutenant Colonel Barker reportedly relayed more specific directives. Soldiers were ordered to burn houses, kill livestock, destroy food supplies, and either destroy or poison wells.
At a pre-mission briefing, Captain Ernest Medina informed Charlie Company that by 7:00 AM, most civilians would have left for the market. He suggested that anyone remaining in the hamlets was likely a Viet Cong fighter or sympathizer.
Medina’s orders regarding civilians remain disputed. Some soldiers recalled being told to kill all suspected enemies, including women, children, and even animals. Others testified that Medina had framed it as a conventional search-and-destroy mission.
During Lieutenant William Calley Jr.’s trial, a defense witness testified that Medina had instructed them to eliminate everything “walking, crawling, or growling.” Some soldiers recalled Medina stating, “They’re all VC, now go and get them.”
Charlie Company was to enter Sơn Mỹ with 1st Platoon leading the assault. The other two companies from TF Barker were tasked with securing the area and providing support if needed.
The region was designated a free fire zone, meaning American forces could use artillery and air strikes without restriction. Soldiers understood this to mean that there would be no distinction between combatants and civilians.
Varnado Simpson, a rifleman in Charlie Company, later admitted the orders left no room for discretion. “We were told to leave nothing standing,” he said. “We did what we were told, regardless of whether they were civilians.”
The Massacre Begins
At 7:30 AM on March 16, 1968, approximately 100 soldiers from Charlie Company, led by Captain Ernest Medina, landed in Sơn Mỹ following an artillery and helicopter gunship barrage. The area was a collection of homesteads, settlements, rice paddies, and irrigation ditches, with the largest hamlets being Mỹ Lai, Cổ Lũy, Mỹ Khê, and Tu Cung.
The soldiers expected to engage the Viet Cong’s 48th Local Force Battalion, one of the most experienced units in the region. Despite encountering no immediate resistance, they suspected guerrillas were hiding in the huts or underground.
Gunships had earlier fired on a few armed individuals near Mỹ Lai, killing four, and later recovered a single weapon. However, when Charlie Company advanced into the hamlets, they found only civilians—women cooking breakfast, children playing, and elderly men preparing for the market.
At 8:00 AM, 1st Platoon, led by Lieutenant William Calley, and 2nd Platoon, led by Lieutenant Stephen Brooks, entered Tu Cung in a line formation. They fired into rice fields and brush as they approached, assuming anyone in the open was a threat.
Instead of enemy combatants, they encountered unarmed villagers who did not immediately flee. The civilians were gathered into common spaces, seemingly unaware of the terror about to unfold.
According to Harry Stanley, a machine gunner with Charlie Company, the killings started without warning. He first witnessed a soldier stab a Vietnamese man with a bayonet, push another into a well, and throw a grenade inside.
In another instance, fifteen to twenty villagers, mostly women and children, knelt around a temple burning incense and praying. They were shot in the head at close range, their pleas ignored.
The worst of the violence occurred in Xom Lang, a sub-hamlet of Tu Cung with around 700 residents. Misidentified on U.S. military maps as Mỹ Lai, it became the focal point of the massacre.
A group of 70–80 villagers was rounded up by 1st Platoon and forced toward an irrigation ditch. Calley ordered his men to push them in and open fire, personally shooting alongside his soldiers.
Private First Class Paul Meadlo later testified that he emptied multiple M16 magazines into the crowd. He recalled women shielding their children and pleading, “No VC,” only to be gunned down.
Meadlo believed the villagers were armed with hidden grenades, an assumption that justified his actions in his mind. He later admitted he was shooting old men, women, teenagers, and even babies, convinced they were potential threats.
Private First Class Dennis Konti, a prosecution witness, described an especially horrifying moment. He recalled that women threw themselves over their children to protect them, only for Calley to shoot the children one by one.
Other members of 1st Platoon reported that many individual killings occurred throughout Mỹ Lai. Livestock was also shot to ensure the hamlets could no longer support the Viet Cong.
When Private First Class Michael Bernhardt entered Xom Lang, the massacre was already in progress. He saw hooches and huts set on fire, villagers gunned down as they ran, and people grouped together and executed.
Bernhardt recalled that soldiers waited for people to flee burning buildings before opening fire. In one instance, he saw an M79 grenade launcher fired into a cluster of survivors, finishing off those still alive.
A separate group of 20–50 villagers was herded south of Xom Lang and executed on a dirt road. Sergeant Ronald Haeberle, an Army photographer, later testified that soldiers fired their M16s and M79 grenade launchers indiscriminately.
Haeberle recalled seeing a group of 15 women and children walking on a dirt road when soldiers suddenly opened fire. “I couldn’t believe what I was seeing,” he said, describing how they were gunned down without warning.
Lieutenant Calley himself participated in the executions. Arriving at one of the ditches filled with villagers, he watched his men shooting, then stepped forward and began firing from five feet away.
At one point, a helicopter landed nearby, and its pilot offered to help evacuate the wounded. Calley reportedly responded that “a hand grenade was the only available means he had for their evacuation.”
By 11:00 AM, Captain Medina radioed an order to cease fire. Many soldiers sat down for lunch, eating their rations just yards away from the bodies of the people they had slaughtered.
Meanwhile, 2nd Platoon had been conducting its own sweep through Mỹ Lai and neighboring Binh Tay. At least 60–70 Vietnamese were killed in these operations, mostly women and children.
After the first sweeps by 1st and 2nd Platoons, 3rd Platoon was sent to eliminate any “remaining resistance.” They reportedly rounded up and executed another group of seven to twelve women and children.
Elsewhere, Bravo Company of Task Force Barker was flown to a different location, attacking the sub-hamlet of Mỹ Hoi. Between 60 and 155 people were killed there, most of them civilians.
Throughout the rest of the day, both Charlie and Bravo Companies continued burning homes and mistreating villagers. While some soldiers refused to participate, none openly protested or reported the killings.
Military historian William Thomas Allison later summarized the scale of the atrocity. “By midmorning, members of Charlie Company had killed hundreds of civilians and raped or assaulted countless women and young girls,” he wrote.
By the time the massacre ended, Charlie Company had suffered just one casualty—a soldier who deliberately shot himself in the foot to avoid participating. Only three enemy weapons were recovered from the entire operation.
Sexual Violence at Mỹ Lai
The Peers Commission Investigation, conducted by the U.S. government, found that at least 20 Vietnamese women and girls were raped during the Mỹ Lai massacre. However, the true number of sexual assaults remains unknown, as the investigation only recorded cases with explicit signs of rape, such as torn clothing and nudity.
Reports indicate that victims ranged in age from 10 to 45, with nine of them under 18. The assaults included gang rapes and forms of sexual torture, further compounding the brutality of the massacre.
Despite these findings, no U.S. serviceman was ever charged with rape. The absence of legal consequences highlights the extent of impunity surrounding the events at Mỹ Lai.
Eyewitness accounts documented by journalist Seymour Hersh provide further evidence of the atrocities. One woman was raped after her children were murdered by U.S. soldiers, while another witness reported seeing a 13-year-old girl assaulted.
The lack of accountability for these crimes raises difficult questions about how military justice failed in the aftermath of Mỹ Lai. Though the killings were eventually investigated, the systematic sexual violence committed that day was largely overlooked.
Helicopter Crew Intervention
As Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson Jr. piloted his helicopter over Sơn Mỹ village, he saw dead and wounded civilians scattered across the ground. Flying in support of ground forces, he and his crew quickly realized something was terribly wrong.
Thompson and his crew attempted to radio for help, but their calls went unanswered. They landed near a ditch filled with bodies, where they noticed some survivors still moving.
When Thompson asked Sergeant David Mitchell of 1st Platoon if he could assist the wounded, Mitchell replied that he would “help them out of their misery.” Confused and horrified, Thompson confronted Lieutenant William Calley, who simply stated he was “just following orders.”
As the helicopter took off, Thompson saw Mitchell firing into the ditch. The indiscriminate killing was continuing, with no one in command taking action to stop it.
Thompson and his crew then saw Captain Ernest Medina kick an unarmed woman before shooting her at point-blank range. Medina later claimed he thought she had a grenade, but there was no evidence to support his claim.
Nearby, soldiers were preparing to execute another group of civilians huddled in a bunker. Thompson landed and ordered his crew to open fire on any soldier who attempted to kill the villagers.
He confronted Lieutenant Stephen Brooks of 2nd Platoon, telling him there were women and children in the bunker. When Brooks responded that the only way to get them out was with a hand grenade, Thompson took matters into his own hands.
Thompson personally coaxed out 12–16 civilians and stood by them as they were flown to safety in two separate helicopter trips. Despite the killings happening all around him, he ensured at least some lives were saved.
Returning to Mỹ Lai, Thompson and his crew saw even more bodies scattered across the village. Spotting survivors in another ditch, they landed again.
Specialist 4 Glenn Andreotta climbed into the ditch and retrieved a four-year-old girl, covered in blood but miraculously unharmed. She was immediately flown to safety.
Upon returning to base, Thompson reported what he had witnessed to his superiors. He described the scene as “mass murder,” comparing the American soldiers to Nazis.
Thompson reported the massacre to his company commander, Major Frederic W. Watke, using words like “murder” and “needless and unnecessary killings.” His account was later corroborated by other helicopter pilots and crew members.
For his actions that day, Thompson was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, while his crew members, Glenn Andreotta and Lawrence Colburn, received the Bronze Star. Andreotta’s medal was posthumous, as he was killed in Vietnam on April 8, 1968.
However, the citation for Thompson’s medal included a fabricated claim that he had rescued a girl from “intense crossfire.” Disgusted, Thompson threw the medal away in protest.
It wasn’t until March 1998 that Thompson and his crew were properly honored. They were awarded the Soldier’s Medal, the highest U.S. Army decoration for bravery not involving combat.
The citation acknowledged their heroism in saving at least 10 Vietnamese civilians “during the unlawful massacre of non-combatants by American forces at My Lai.” The recognition had been long delayed but finally acknowledged the moral courage they displayed that day.
Thompson initially refused the award when the Army attempted to present it quietly. He insisted that it be given publicly and that his entire crew be honored alongside him.
Reporting the Massacre and Initial Cover-Up
After returning to base around 11:00 AM, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson Jr. reported the killings to his superiors. His allegations quickly reached Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, the overall commander of the operation.
Barker, concerned by the report, radioed his executive officer to get an explanation from Captain Ernest Medina. Medina, realizing the situation was being scrutinized, issued a cease-fire order to Charlie Company, telling them to “cut [the killing] out – knock it off.”
Despite Thompson’s report, the military’s initial response was to downplay the massacre. Colonel Oran Henderson, commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade, interviewed Thompson but took no significant action beyond canceling similar planned operations in nearby villages.
On March 27, 1968—just eleven days after the killings—Henderson issued a letter of commendation to Medina. The following day, Task Force Barker submitted an official combat report stating that the Mỹ Lai operation was a success, claiming that 128 Viet Cong combatants had been killed.
General Samuel Koster, commander of the Americal Division, reinforced this narrative by congratulating Charlie Company for their “outstanding action.” Even General William Westmoreland, head of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), initially praised the unit, saying they had dealt the enemy “a heavy blow.”
Westmoreland later changed his position, writing in his memoirs that the massacre was “the conscious massacre of defenseless babies, children, mothers, and old men in a kind of diabolical slow-motion nightmare.” Despite this admission, at the time of the incident, he had fully endorsed the cover-up.
Due to the chaotic nature of the war and the lack of official body counts for noncombatants, the exact number of civilians killed at Mỹ Lai remains uncertain. The U.S. Army’s estimate was 347 deaths, while the local Vietnamese government reported 504, a figure memorialized at the massacre site.
Initial Investigation and Suppression of Evidence
The official narrative stated that 128 Viet Cong and 22 civilians had been killed in a “fierce firefight.” Military newspaper Stars and Stripes repeated this claim, reinforcing the perception that Mỹ Lai had been a battlefield victory.
On the day of the massacre, the Americal Division’s daily press briefing, known as the “Five O’Clock Follies,” included a routine statement: “In an action today, Americal Division forces killed 128 enemy near Quảng Ngãi City.” No mention was made of civilian casualties.
The first internal Army investigation was conducted by Colonel Henderson, who interviewed some soldiers involved. His written report, completed in April, claimed only 20 civilians had been unintentionally killed, mostly due to artillery fire. He maintained that the rest of the deaths were legitimate combat casualties.
For six months, this version of events remained unchallenged. But in late 1968, a 21-year-old soldier, Tom Glen, sent a letter to General Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland’s successor as MACV commander. Glen described the widespread brutality against Vietnamese civilians he had personally witnessed.
His letter did not specifically mention Mỹ Lai, but it painted a picture of systemic violence. “It would indeed be terrible to believe that an American soldier who harbors such disregard for justice and human feeling is a prototype of all American national character,” Glen wrote.
Major Colin Powell, then a 31-year-old Army officer serving as an assistant chief of staff for operations, was tasked with investigating Glen’s claims. Powell’s report dismissed the allegations, stating, “In direct refutation of this portrayal is the fact that relations between Americal Division soldiers and the Vietnamese people are excellent.”
A later U.S. Army case study noted that Powell “proved unable to uncover either widespread unnecessary killings, war crimes, or any facts related to Mỹ Lai.” His handling of the case has since been criticized as an attempt to whitewash the incident.
Years later, as U.S. Secretary of State, Powell reflected on the massacre. “These sorts of horrible things happen every now and again, but they are still to be deplored,” he told CNN’s Larry King in 2004.
The Whistleblower and Public Exposure
While Glen’s letter failed to prompt action, another soldier, Specialist 5 Ronald Ridenhour, took a different approach. Ridenhour, a former door gunner with the 11th Infantry Brigade, had heard firsthand accounts of Mỹ Lai from members of Charlie Company.
In March 1969, he sent a detailed letter to 30 members of Congress, urging them to investigate what he called the “Pinkville” massacre. He described the mass killing of civilians and named potential witnesses, including Private First Class Michael Bernhardt.
Most lawmakers ignored his letter, but Congressman Mo Udall and Senators Barry Goldwater and Edward Brooke pressed for answers. Their pressure led to an official Army inquiry into the incident.
Under mounting scrutiny, on September 9, 1969, the Army quietly charged Lieutenant William Calley with six counts of premeditated murder. His trial was not initially publicized, but investigative journalist Seymour Hersh soon uncovered the story.
On November 13, 1969—more than 18 months after the massacre—Hersh published an explosive report on Mỹ Lai through the Dispatch News Service. His account, based on interviews with Calley, appeared in 35 newspapers across the United States.
The next day, The New York Times and The Alabama Journal ran separate stories confirming the allegations. On November 20, The Cleveland Plain Dealer published explicit photographs taken by Army photographer Ronald Haeberle, showing bodies of murdered civilians.
That same day, Time, Life, and Newsweek all featured the massacre on their covers. CBS aired an interview with Paul Meadlo, a Charlie Company soldier, who admitted to killing unarmed villagers.
The White House immediately recognized the severity of the scandal. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, speaking privately to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, admitted that while he wished to “sweep it under the rug,” the photos made that impossible. “There are so many kids just laying there,” he said. “These pictures are authentic.”
The Nixon Administration’s Response
Inside the Nixon administration, officials scrambled to contain the damage. Kissinger warned that a “game plan” was needed, including a press strategy and efforts to discredit key witnesses.
A White House task force was formed to manage the crisis. Their tactics included questioning Hersh’s motives and undermining the credibility of eyewitnesses. Their goal was to prevent the scandal from derailing public support for the war.
As Congress demanded answers, Army General Counsel Robert Jordan addressed the press but refused to confirm any allegations against Calley. ABC’s Bill Downs noted that Jordan’s statement was significant, marking the first time a high-ranking official publicly acknowledged that U.S. troops might have committed atrocities.
The Peers Commission Investigation
On November 24, 1969, the Army appointed Lieutenant General William R. Peers to lead a formal investigation. His final report, presented in March 1970, was highly critical of both the massacre and the subsequent cover-up.
Peers found that at least 175–200 Vietnamese civilians had been killed at Sơn Mỹ. While only a few were confirmed as Viet Cong, he noted that even suspected enemy supporters were executed without cause.
Beyond the killings, Peers concluded that the cover-up was just as disturbing. He recommended court-martial proceedings against 34 individuals, including high-ranking officers.
Hugh Thompson, the pilot who had intervened to save civilians, later praised the Peers investigation. “He pulled no punches,” Thompson said. “Congress didn’t like his investigation because he went after some very high-ranking individuals.”
Massacres Beyond Mỹ Lai
Journalist Jonathan Schell later wrote that Quảng Ngãi province, where Mỹ Lai occurred, had been devastated by U.S. military operations. Up to 70% of villages had been destroyed by airstrikes and napalm, with tens of thousands of civilians killed annually.
Schell argued that Mỹ Lai was not an isolated event but the extreme end of a much larger pattern of indiscriminate violence against civilians. His assessment was reinforced by Army records showing that civilian deaths were frequently misreported as enemy combatants.
A Pentagon task force later documented 320 additional alleged massacres by U.S. forces between 1967 and 1971. The records revealed a systemic underreporting of war crimes, with many incidents remaining uninvestigated.
Legal Consequences and Court-Martial
In 1970, 14 officers, including Major General Koster, were charged with covering up the massacre. Only one, Colonel Henderson, stood trial, and he was acquitted.
Lieutenant Calley was convicted of murdering at least 20 people and sentenced to life in prison. Two days later, President Richard Nixon ordered his release from military custody.
Over time, Calley’s sentence was reduced, and he ultimately served only three-and-a-half years under house arrest. The trials failed to hold higher-ranking officers accountable, effectively ending efforts to prosecute those responsible.
Aftermath and Reflection
In early 1972, the camp at Mỹ Lai (2), where massacre survivors had been relocated, was largely destroyed by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) artillery and aerial bombardment. The destruction scattered remaining eyewitnesses, and the incident was officially blamed on “Viet Cong terrorists.”
Despite this explanation, Quaker service workers in the area provided testimony that contradicted the official account. In May 1972, Martin Teitel testified before the U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, and his report was later published in The New York Times in June.
Many American soldiers who had been in Mỹ Lai struggled with the moral weight of what had happened. Some accepted personal responsibility, while others expressed regret without admitting direct guilt.
Captain Ernest Medina, acquitted of any wrongdoing, later reflected, “I have regrets for it, but I have no guilt over it because I didn’t cause it. That’s not what the military, particularly the United States Army, is trained for.”
Some soldiers, like Lawrence La Croix, a squad leader in Charlie Company, believed disobeying an order was not an option. “Trust me. There is no such thing. Not in the military,” he said in 2010. “If I tell them, ‘I’m not going to follow that order,’ well, they’d put me up against the wall and shoot me.”
On March 16, 1998, a gathering of American veterans, former Vietnamese soldiers, and local villagers commemorated the 30th anniversary of the massacre at Sơn Mỹ. Among them were Hugh Thompson and Lawrence Colburn, who had shielded civilians during the attack.
Phan Thi Nhanh, a survivor who was 14 at the time, remembered the moment Thompson saved her life. “We don’t say we forget. We just try not to think about the past, but in our hearts, we keep a place to think about that,” she said.
Colburn, addressing the event, challenged Lieutenant Calley to confront the survivors directly. “Look at the tears in their eyes and tell them why it happened,” he said. No U.S. officials or diplomats attended the gathering.
On March 16, 2008, the 40th anniversary of the massacre, over a thousand people gathered at the Sơn Mỹ Memorial. Survivors, families of victims, and some returning U.S. veterans joined in remembrance.
One woman, who was only eight years old when the massacre occurred, recalled her trauma: “Everyone in my family was killed—my mother, my father, my brother, and three sisters. They threw me into a ditch full of dead bodies. I was covered with blood and brains.”
The U.S. had no official presence at the ceremony, but a volunteer group from Wisconsin called Madison Quakers participated. Over the past decade, they had built three schools in Mỹ Lai and planted a peace garden.
On August 19, 2009, Lieutenant William Calley made his first public apology for the massacre, speaking to the Kiwanis Club of Greater Columbus, Georgia. It was the first time he publicly expressed remorse.
“There is not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened that day in My Lai,” Calley said. “I feel remorse for the Vietnamese who were killed, for their families, for the American soldiers involved and their families. I am very sorry.”
When asked why he did not refuse the orders, he admitted, “I was a 2nd lieutenant getting orders from my commander, and I followed them—foolishly, I guess.”
For many survivors, Calley’s apology did little to ease decades of pain. Trần Văn Đức, who was seven years old during the massacre and now lives in Germany, called the apology “terse.”
In a public letter to Calley, Trần reminded him that time had not erased the grief. “The sorrow over lost lives will forever stay in Mỹ Lai,” he wrote, emphasizing that the pain endured by survivors had not faded with the decades.
Media Silence and the Breaking of the Mỹ Lai Story
A photographer and a reporter from the 11th Brigade Information Office were embedded with Task Force Barker and landed with Charlie Company in Sơn Mỹ on March 16, 1968. Despite witnessing the events firsthand, neither Americal News Sheet nor the Trident—the brigade’s newsletter—reported civilian deaths.
Instead, on March 18, Stars and Stripes published a glowing piece titled “U.S. Troops Surround Red, Kill 128,” portraying the operation as a victory. Even on April 12, Trident falsely reported that three raids into Mỹ Lai had resulted in 276 Viet Cong casualties, omitting the reality of mass civilian killings.
On April 4, 1968, the 11th Brigade’s information office issued a press release titled “Recent Operations in Pinkville.” It, too, avoided mentioning mass casualties, reinforcing the official narrative that Mỹ Lai had been a successful military operation.
A later criminal investigation found that both the embedded reporter and photographer had deliberately concealed evidence. The reporter wrote a false and misleading account, while the photographer withheld photographic proof of the atrocities.
For many soldiers in Vietnam, atrocities were not an exception but part of an accepted reality. As David H. Hackworth later remarked, “Vietnam was an atrocity from the get-go… There were hundreds of My Lais. You got your card punched by the numbers of bodies you counted.”
The first public mention of the Mỹ Lai massacre appeared in American media only after Fort Benning issued a press release on September 5, 1969. The statement confirmed that Lieutenant William Calley had been charged with murder.
NBC picked up the story on September 10, airing a segment on The Huntley-Brinkley Report that reported the killings of civilians in South Vietnam. Still, the full extent of the massacre remained hidden.
Ronald Ridenhour, the whistleblower who had spent months urging an investigation, disobeyed Army orders to stay silent. He approached Phoenix Republic reporter Ben Cole, who refused to publish the story. Another journalist, Charles Black of the Columbus Enquirer, independently discovered details of the massacre but also chose not to report on it.
Even The New York Times and The Washington Post received tips about the massacre but initially hesitated to act. The culture of self-censorship among the American press delayed the story’s exposure.
Determined to break the silence, Ridenhour contacted freelance investigative journalist Seymour Hersh on October 22, 1969. Hersh conducted his own inquiry and uncovered the full scope of the atrocity.
Initially, Hersh tried to sell the story to major magazines such as Life and Look, but both rejected it. He then turned to the small, Washington-based Dispatch News Service, which sent the report to fifty major newspapers. Thirty accepted it for publication.
Meanwhile, New York Times reporter Henry Kamm traveled to South Vietnam, where he interviewed massacre survivors. His reporting estimated the civilian death toll at 567, a number higher than even the Vietnamese government’s official count.
Following Hersh’s exposé, Ben Cole published an article on Ronald Ridenhour, detailing his role in exposing the massacre. Around the same time, Army photographer Ronald Haeberle reached out to journalist Joseph Eszterhas of The Plain Dealer in Cleveland.
On November 20, 1969, The Plain Dealer published Haeberle’s shocking images—photographs of bodies strewn across the village, including women, children, and the elderly. The images made it impossible for the government to dismiss the massacre as battlefield confusion.
A week later, Time published a detailed account on November 28, 1969, followed by Life on December 5. Both magazines featured Haeberle’s photographs, cementing Mỹ Lai’s place in public discourse.
Richard L. Strout, a political commentator for The Christian Science Monitor, criticized the American press for suppressing the story. “American press self-censorship thwarted Mr. Ridenhour’s disclosures for a year,” he wrote, quoting an agent who said, “No one wanted to go into it.”
Once the wall of silence was broken, Mỹ Lai became a dominant topic in American and international media. Stories and interviews with witnesses, survivors, and soldiers began appearing regularly, keeping the massacre in the public eye.
In response to the scandal, ABC anchorman Frank Reynolds reflected on its impact on the American psyche. “Our spirit as a people is scarred,” he said. “The massacre offers the most compelling argument yet advanced for America to end its involvement in Vietnam—not alone because of what the war is doing to the Vietnamese or to our reputation abroad, but because of what it is doing to us.”
Legacy of the Mỹ Lai Massacre
The Mỹ Lai massacre stands as one of the darkest moments in U.S. military history. It was not just an atrocity committed in the heat of war, but a crime that was deliberately covered up, denied, and ignored for over a year.
The massacre shattered public trust in the U.S. military and fueled growing opposition to the Vietnam War. The disturbing images and survivor testimonies forced Americans to confront the brutality of the conflict, challenging the official narrative of a just war fought for democracy.
Legal accountability for the massacre was almost nonexistent. Despite overwhelming evidence, only one man—Lieutenant William Calley—was convicted, and even he served only three-and-a-half years under house arrest. The failure to hold higher-ranking officers accountable reinforced the perception that justice in war crimes cases was selective and politically motivated.
Decades later, the survivors of Mỹ Lai continue to live with the trauma of that day. While some soldiers and officers have expressed remorse, others have justified their actions under the pretense of following orders. The massacre remains a painful reminder of the human cost of war and the dangers of dehumanizing the enemy.
The events at Mỹ Lai are more than a historical tragedy; they serve as a warning. They remind us of what happens when oversight fails, when soldiers are conditioned to see civilians as threats, and when institutions prioritize self-preservation over justice. The question that lingers is not just how Mỹ Lai happened, but whether the lessons of that day have truly been learned.
